We model Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting systems as a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted variants of this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there are no constantfactor approximation algorithms. Yet, we also show cases where good approximation algorithms exist (briefly put, these variants correspond to optimizing total voter satisfaction under Borda scores, within Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems).
Introduction
Resource allocation is one of the most important issues in multiagent systems, equally important both to human societies and to artificial software agents [29] . For example, if there is a set of items (or a set of bundles of items) to distribute among agents then we may use one of many auction mechanisms (see, e.g., [22, 29] for an introduction and a review, and numerous recent papers on auction theory for current results). However, typically in auctions if an agent obtains an item (a resource) then this agent has exclusive access to it. In this paper we consider resource allocation for items that can be shared, and we are interested in computing (approximately) optimal assignments (in particular, for settings where resource allocation boils down to multiwinner voting). As opposed to a large body of research on auctions, resource allocation, and mechanism design, we do not make any strategic considerations.
Let us explain our resource allocation problem through an example. Consider a company that wants to provide free sport classes to its employees. We have a set N = {1, . . . , n} of employees and a set A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } of classes that are offered. Naturally, not every class is equally appealing to each employee and, thus, each employee orders the classes from the most desirable one to the least desirable one. For example, the first employee might have preference order a 1 a 3 · · · a m , meaning that for him or her a 1 is the most attractive class, a 3 is second, and so on, until a m , which is least appealing. Further, each class a i has some maximum capacity cap a i , that is, a maximum number of people that can comfortably participate, and a cost, denoted c a i , of opening the class (independent of the number of participants). The company wants to assign the employees to the classes so that it does not exceed its sport-classes budget B and so that the employees' satisfaction is maximal (or, equivalently, their dissatisfaction is minimal).
There are many ways to measure (dis)satisfaction. For example, we may measure an employee's dissatisfaction as the position of the class to which he or she was assigned in his or her preference order (and satisfaction as m less the voter's dissatisfaction). Then, we could demand that, for example, the maximum dissatisfaction of an employee is as low as possible (minimal satisfaction is as high as possible; in economics this corresponds to egalitarian social welfare) or that the sum of dissatisfactions is minimal (the sum of satisfactions is maximal; this corresponds to the utilitarian approach in economics).
It turns out that our model generalizes two well-known multiwinner voting rules; namely, those of Monroe [20] and of Chamberlin and Courant [8] . Under both these rules voters from the set N submit preference orders regarding alternatives from the set A, and the goal is to select K candidates (the representatives) best representing the voters. For simplicity, let us assume that K divides N . 1 Under Monroe's rule we have to match each selected representative to N K voters so that each voter has a unique representative and so that the sum of voters' dissatisfactions is minimal (dissatisfaction is, again, measured by the position of the representative in the voter's preference order). Chamberlin and Courant's rule is similar except that there are no restrictions on the number of voters a given alternative represents (in this case it is better to think of the alternatives as political parties rather than particular politicians). It is easy to see that both methods are special cases of our setting: For example, for Monroe it suffices to set the "cost" of each alternative to be 1, to set the budget to be K, and to set the "capacity" of each alternative to be N K . We can consider variants of these two systems using different measures of voter (dis)satisfaction, as indicated above (see also the works of Potthoff and Brams [24] , Betzler et al. [4] and of Lu and Boutilier [19] ).
Unfortunately, it is well-known that both Monroe's method and Chamberlin and Courant's method are NP-hard to compute in essentially all nontrivial settings [4, 19, 25] . This holds even if various natural parameters of the election are low [4] . Notable exceptions include, e.g., the case where K is bounded by a fixed constant and the case where voter preferences are single-peaked [4] .
Nonetheless, Lu and Boutilier [19] -starting from a very different motivation and context-propose to rectify the high computational complexity of Chamberlin and Courant's system by designing approximation algorithms. In particular, they show that if one focuses on the sum of voters' satisfactions, then there is a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with approximation ratio (1 − 1 e ) ≈ 0.63 (i.e., their algorithm outputs an assignment that achieves no less than about 0.63 of optimal voter satisfaction). Unfortunately, total satisfaction is a tricky measure. For example, under standard Chamberlin and Courant's system, a 1 2 -approximation algorithm is allowed to match each voter to an alternative somewhere in the middle of this voter's preference order, even if there is a feasible solution that matches each voter to his or her most preferred candidate. On the other hand, it seems that a 1 2 -approximation focusing on total dissatisfaction would give results of very high quality.
The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of our resource allocation scenario, focusing on approximation algorithms for the special cases of Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems. We obtain the following results:
1. Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's systems are hard to approximate up to any constant factor for the case where we measure dissatisfaction, irrespective of whether we measure the total dissatisfaction (Theorems 1 and 3) or the dissatisfaction of the most dissatisfied voter (Theorems 2 and 4).
2. Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's systems are hard to approximate within any constant factor for the case where we measure satisfaction of the least satisfied voter (Theorems 5 and 7). However, there are good approximation algorithms for total satisfaction-for the Monroe's system we achieve approximation ratio arbitrarily close to 0.715 (and often a much better one; see Section 4.1). For Chamberlin and Courant's system we give a polynomial-time approximation scheme (that is, for each , 0 < < 1, we have a polynomial-time (1 − )-approximation algorithm; see Theorem 13).
Our work is similar to several lines of research on computational social choice and multiagent systems. In particular, there is a well-established line of work on the hardness and approximability of winner determination for single-winner voting rules, with results for, for example, Dodgson's rule [3, 6, 7, 12, 15 ], Kemeny's rule [1, 3, 10, 16, 17 ], Young's rule [6, 27] , and Ranked Pairs method [5] . Hardness of winner determination for multiwinner voting rules was studied by Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [25] , by Lu and Boutilier [19] , and by Betzler, Slinko and Uhlman [4] . Lu and Boutilier, while starting from a different context, initiated the study of approximation algorithms in this setting, which we continue and extend in this paper.
In the context of resource allocation, our model closely resembles multi-unit resource allocation with single-unit demand [29, Chapter 11] (see also the work of Chevaleyre et al. [9] for a survey of the most fundamental issues in the multiagent resource allocation theory). The problem of multi-unit resource allocation is mostly addressed in the context of auctions (and so it is referred in the literature as multi-unit auctions); in contrast, we consider the problem of finding a solution maximizing the social welfare given the agents' preferences. More generally, our model, is similar to resource allocation with sharable indivisible goods [2, 9] . The most substantial difference is that we require each agent to be assigned to exactly one alternative. Also, in the context of resource allocation with sharable items, it is often assumed that the agents' satisfaction is affected by the number of agents using the alternatives (the congestion on the alternatives). This forms a class of problems that are closely related to congestion games [26] . Finally, it is worth mentioning that in the literature on resource allocation it is common to consider other criteria of optimality, such as envy-freeness [18] , Pareto optimality, Nash equilibria [2] , and others.
Finally, we should mention that our paper is very close in spirit (especially in terms of the motivation of the resource allocation problem) to the recent work of Darmann et al. [11] .
Preliminaries
We first define basic notions such as, e.g., preference orders and positional scoring rules. Then we present our resource allocation problem in full generality and discuss restrictions modeling Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems. Finally, we briefly recall relevant notions regarding computational complexity theory.
Alternatives, Profiles, Positional Scoring Functions. For each n ∈ N, we take [n] to mean {1, . . . , n}. We assume that there is a set N = [n] of agents and a set A = {a 1 , . . . a m } of alternatives. Each agent i has weight w i ∈ N, and each alternative a has capacity cap a ∈ N and cost c a ∈ N. The weight of an agent corresponds to its size (measured in some abstract way). An alternative's capacity gives the total weight of the agents that can be assigned to it, and its cost gives the price of selecting the alternative (the price is the same irrespective of the weight of the agents assigned to the alternative). Further, each agent i has a preference order i over A, i.e., a strict linear order of the form a π(1) i a π(2) i · · · i a π(m) for some permutation π of [m] . For an alternative a, by pos i (a) we mean the position of a in i'th agent's preference order. For example, if a is the most preferred alternative for i then pos i (a) = 1, and if a is the most despised one then pos i (a) = m. A collection V = ( 1 , . . . , n ) of agents' preference orders is called a preference profile. We write L(A) to denote the set of all possible preference orders over A. Thus, for preference profile V of n agents we have V ∈ L(A) n .
In our computational hardness proofs, we will often include subsets of alternatives in the descriptions of preference orders. For example, if A is the set of alternatives and B is some nonempty strict subset of A, then by saying that some agent has preference order of the form B A − B, we mean that this agent ranks all the alternatives in B ahead of all the alternatives outside of B, and that the order in which this agent ranks alternatives within B and within A − B is irrelevant (and, thus, one can assume any easily computable order).
A positional scoring function (PSF) is a function
Intuitively, if β m is an IPSF then β m (i) gives the dissatisfaction that an agent suffers from when assigned to an alternative that is ranked i'th on his or her preference order. Thus, we assume that for each IPSF β m it holds that β m (1) = 0 (an agent is not dissatisfied by his or her top alternative). Similarly, a DPSF γ m measures an agent's satisfaction and we assume that for each DPSF γ m it holds that γ m (m) = 0.
We will often speak of families α of IPSFs (DPSFs) of the form {α m | m ∈ N, α m is a PSF}, where the following holds:
In other words, we build our families of IPSFs (DPSFs) by appending (prepending) values to functions with smaller domains. We assume that each function α m from a family can be computed in polynomial time with respect to m. To simplify notation, we will refer to such families of IPSFs (DPSFs) as normal IPSFs (normal DPSFs).
We are particularly interested in normal IPSFs (normal DPSFs) corresponding to the Borda count method. That is, in the families of IPSFs α m B,inc (i) = i − 1 (in the families of DPSFs α m B,dec (i) = m − i). Our Resource Allocation Problem. We consider a problem of finding function Φ : N → A that assigns each agent to some alternative (we will call Φ an assignment function). We say that Φ is feasible if for each alternative a it holds that the total weight of the agents assigned to it does not exceed its capacity cap a . Further, we define the cost of assignment Φ to be cost(Φ) = a:Φ −1 (a) =∅ c a .
Given an IPSF (DPSF) α m , we consider two dissatisfaction functions, α 1 (Φ) and α ∞ (Φ), (two satisfaction functions, α 1 (Φ) and min α (Φ)), measuring the quality of the assignment as follows:
The former one measures agents' total dissatisfaction (satisfaction), whereas the latter one considers the most dissatisfied (the least satisfied) agent only. In welfare economics and multiagent resource allocation theory the two metrics correspond to, respectively, utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare. We define our resource allocation problem as follows.
Definition 1. Let α be a normal IPSF. An instance of α-Assignment-Inc problem consists of a set of agents N = [n], a set of alternatives A = {a 1 , . . . a m }, a preference profile V of the agents, a sequence (w 1 , . . . , w n ) of agents' weights, sequences (cap a 1 , . . . , cap am ) and (c a 1 , . . . , c am ) of alternatives' capacities and costs, respectively, and budget B ∈ N. We ask for the assignment function Φ such that:
2. ∀ a∈A i:Φ(i)=a w i ≤ cap a , and
In other words, in α-Assignment-Inc we ask for a feasible assignment that minimizes the total dissatisfaction of the agents without exceeding the budget.
Problem α-Assignment-Dec is defined identically except that α is a normal DPSF and in the third condition we seek to maximize α 1 (Φ) (that is, in α-Assignment-Dec our goal is to maximize total satisfaction). If we replace α 1 with α ∞ in α-Assignment-Inc then we obtain problem α-Minmax-Assignment-Inc, where we seek to minimize the dissatisfaction of the most dissatisfied agent. If we replace α 1 with min α in α-Assignment-Dec then we obtain problem α-Minmax-Assignment-Dec, where we seek to maximize the satisfaction of the least satisfied agent.
As far as optimal solutions go, satisfaction and dissatisfaction formulations of our problems are equivalent. However, as we will see, there are striking differences in terms of their approximability.
Clearly, each of our four Assignment problems is NP-complete: Even without costs they reduce to the standard NP-complete Partition problem, where we ask if a set of integers (in our case these integers would be agents' weights) can be split evenly between two sets (in our case, two alternatives with the capacities equal to half of the total agent weight). However, in very many applications (for example, in the sport classes example from the introduction) it suffices to consider unit-weight agents. Thus, from now on we assume the agents have unit weights.
Our four problems can be viewed as generalizations of Monroe's [20] and Chamberlin and Courant's [8] multiwinner voting systems (see the introduction for their definitions). To model Monroe's system, it suffices to set the budget B = K, the cost of each alternative to be 1, and the capacity of each alternative to be N K (for simplicity, throughout the paper we assume that K divides N ). We will refer to thus restricted variants of our problems as Monroe-Assignment variants. To represent Chamberlin and Courant's system within our framework, it suffices to take the same restrictions as for Monroe's system, except that each alternative has capacity equal to N . We will refer to thus restricted variants of our problems as CC-Assignment variants.
The eight above-defined special cases of our resource allocation problem were, in various forms and shapes, considered by Procaccia, Rosenschein, and Zohar [25] , Lu and Boutilier [19] , and Betzler, Slinko and Uhlmann [4] .
Computational Complexity, Approximation Algorithms. For many normal IPSFs α (and, in particular, for Borda count), even the above-mentioned restricted versions of the original problem, namely, α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc, α-Minmax-MonroeAssignment-Inc, α-CC-Assignment-Inc, and α-Minmax-CC-Assignment-Inc are NP-complete [4, 25] (the same holds for normal DPSFs and Dec variants of the problems). Thus, we explore possibilities for approximate solutions.
Definition 2. Let β be a real number such that β ≥ 1 (0 < β ≤ 1) and let α be a normal IPSF (a normal DPSF). An algorithm is a β-approximation algorithm for α-AssignmentInc problem (for α-Assignment-Dec problem) if on each instance I it returns a feasible assignment Φ that meets the budget restriction and such that α 1 (Φ) ≤ β · OPT (and such that α 1 (Φ) ≥ β · OPT), where OPT is the aggregated dissatisfaction (satisfaction) α 1 (Φ OPT ) of the optimal assignment Φ OPT .
We define β-approximation algorithms for the Minmax variants of our problems analogously. For example, Lu and Boutilier [19] present a (1 − 1 e )-approximation algorithm for the case of CC-Assignment-Dec.
Throughout this paper, we will consider each of the Monroe-Assignment and CCAssignment variants of the problem and for each we will either prove inapproximability with respect to any constant β (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions) or we will show an approximation algorithm. In our inapproximability proofs, we will use the following classic NP-complete problems [14] . Definition 4. Vertex-Cover is a special case of Set-Cover, where U and F are constructed from a given graph G. Specifically, U is the set of G's edges and F = {F 1 , . . . , F n } corresponds to G's vertices (for each vertex v of G, F has a corresponding set F , which contains the edges incident to v).
Definition 5. X3C is a special case of Set-Cover where U is divisible by 3, each member of F has exactly three elements, and K = n 3 .
Note that X3C remains NP-complete even if we additionally assume that n is divisible by 2 and each member of U appears in at most 3 sets from F [14] .
Hardness of Approximation
In this section we present our inapproximability results for Monroe-Assignment and CC-Assignment variants of the resource allocation problem. In particular, we show that if we focus on voter dissatisfaction (i.e., on the Inc variants) then for each β > 1, neither Monroe's nor Chamberlin and Courant's system has a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm. Further, we show that analogous results hold if we focus on the satisfaction of the least satisfied voter.
Naturally, these inapproximability results carry over to more general settings. In particular, unless P = NP, there are no polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithms for the general resource allocation problem for the case where we focus on voter dissatisfaction. On the other hand, our results do not preclude good approximation algorithms for the case where we measure agents' total satisfaction. Indeed, in Section 4 we derive algorithms for several satisfaction-based special cases of the problem.
We start by showing that for each normal IPSF α there is no constant-factor polynomialtime approximation algorithm for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc (and, thus, there is no such algorithm for general α-Assignment-Inc). Theorem 1. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor β, β > 1, there is no polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc unless P = NP.
Proof. Let us fix a normal IPSF α and let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there is some constant β, β > 1, and a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm A for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc.
Let I be an instance of X3C with ground set U = [n] and family F = {F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F m } of 3-element subsets of U . W.l.o.g., we assume that n is divisible by both 2 and 3 and that each member of U appears in at most 3 sets from F.
Given I, we build instance I M of α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc as follows. We set N = U (that is, the elements of the ground set are the agents) and we set A = A 1 ∪ A 2 , where A 1 = {a 1 , . . . , a m } is a set of alternatives corresponding to the sets from the family F and
, is a set of dummy alternatives needed for our construction. We let m = A 2 and we rename the alternatives in A 2 so that A 2 = {b 1 , . . . , b m }. We set K = n 3 . We build agents' preference orders using the following algorithm. For each j ∈ N , set
as the frequency of the elements from U is bounded by 3, m f (j) ≤ 3. For each agent j we set his or her preference order to be of the form M f (j) j A 2 j M l (j), where the alternatives in M f (j) and M l (j) are ranked in an arbitrary way and the alternatives from A 2 are placed at positions m f (j) + 1, . . . , m f (j) + m in the way described below (see Figure  1 for a high-level illustration of the construction).
We place the alternatives from A 2 in the preference orders of the agents in such a way that for each alternative b i ∈ A 2 there are at most two agents that rank b i among their n·α(3)·β top alternatives. The following construction achieves this effect. If (i+j) mod n < 2, then alternative b i is placed at one of the positions m f (j) + 1, . . . , m f (j) + n · α(3) · β in j's preference order. Otherwise, b i is placed at a position with index higher than m f (j) + n · α(3) · β (and, thus, at a position higher than n · α(3) · β). This construction can be implemented because for each agent j there are exactly m ·
Let Φ be an assignment computed by A on I M . We will show that α 1 (Φ) ≤ n · α(3) · β if and only if I is a yes-instance of X3C.
(⇐) If there exists a solution for I (i.e., an exact cover of U with n 3 sets from F), then we can easily show an assignment in which each agent j is assigned to an alternative from the top m f (j) positions of his or her preference order (namely, one that assigns each agent j to the alternative a i ∈ A 1 that corresponds to the set F i , from the exact cover of U , that contains j). Thus, for the optimal assignment Φ OPT it holds that α 1 (Φ OPT ) ≤ α(3) · n. In consequence, A must return an assignment with the total dissatisfaction at most n · α(3) · β.
(⇒) Let us now consider the opposite direction. We assume that A found an assignment Φ such that α 1 (Φ) ≤ n · α(3) · β and we will show that I is a yes-instance of X3C. Since we require each alternative to be assigned to either 0 or 3 agents, if some alternative b i from A 2 were assigned to some 3 agents, at least one of them would rank him or her at a position worse than n · α(3) · β. This would mean that α 1 (Φ) ≥ n · α(3) · β + 1. Analogously, no agent j can be assigned to an alternative that is placed at one of the m l (j) bottom positions of j's preference order. Thus, only the alternatives in A 1 have agents assigned to them and, further, if agents x, y, z, are assigned to some a i ∈ A 1 , then it holds that F i = {x, y, z} (we will call each set F i for which alternative a i is assigned to some agents x, y, z selected ). Since each agent is assigned to exactly one alternative, the selected sets are disjoint. Since the number of selected sets is K = n 3 , it must be the case that the selected sets form an exact cover of U . Thus, I is a yes-instance of X3C.
One may wonder if hardness of approximation for α-Monroe-Assignment-Inc is not an artifact of the strict requirements regarding the budget. It turns out that unless P = NP, there is no β-γ-approximation algorithm that finds an assignment with the following properties: (1) the aggregated dissatisfaction α 1 (Φ) is at most β times higher than the optimal one, (2) the number of alternatives to which agents are assigned is at most γK and (3) each selected alternative (the alternative that has agents assigned), is assigned to no more than γ n K and no less than ).
Results analogous to Theorems 1 and 2 hold for the CC-Assginment-Inc family of problems as well.
Theorem 3. For each normal IPSF α and each constant factor β, β > 1, there is no polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for α-CC-Assignment-Inc unless P = NP.
Proof. Let us fix a normal IPSF α. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is some constant β, β > 1, and a β-approximation algorithm A for α-CC-AssignmentInc. We will show that it is possible to use A to solve the NP-complete Vertex-Cover problem.
Let I = (U, F, K) be an instance of Vertex-Cover, where U = [n] is the ground set, F = {F 1 , . . . , F m } is a family of subsets of U (where each member of U belongs to exactly two sets in F), and K is a positive integer.
Given I, we construct an instance I CC of α-CC-Assignment-Inc in the following way: The set of agents is N = U and the set of alternatives is A = m j=1 A j , where each A j contains exactly α(2) · β · n (unique) alternatives. Intuitively, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the alternatives in A j correspond to the set F j . For each A j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we pick one alternative, which we denote a j . For each agent i ∈ N , we set i's preference order as follows: Let F j and F k , j < k, be the two sets that contain i. Agent i's preference order is of the form a j i a k i A k − {a k } i A − (A k ∪ {a j , a k }) (the particular order of alternatives in the sets A k − {a k } and A − (A k ∪ {a j , a k }) is irrelevant for the construction). We ask for an assignment of the agents to at most K alternatives.
Let us consider a solution Φ returned by A on input I CC . We claim that α 1 (Φ) ≤ n · α(2) · β if and only if I is a yes-instance of Vertex-Cover.
(⇐) If I is a yes-instance then, clearly, each agent i can be assigned to one of the top two alternatives in his or her preference order (if there is a size-K cover, then this assignment selects at most K candidates). Thus the total dissatisfaction of an optimal assignment is at most α(2) · n. As a result, the solution Φ returned by A has total dissatisfaction at most α(2) · β · n.
(⇒) If A returns an assignment with total dissatisfaction no greater than α(2) · β · n, then, by the construction of agents preference orders, we see that each agent i was assigned to an alternative from a set A j such that i ∈ F j . Since the assignment can use at most K alternatives, this directly implies that there is a size-K cover of U with sets from F. Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 works correctly in this case as well. In fact, it even suffices to take the m groups of alternatives, A 1 , . . . , A m , to contain α(2) · β alternatives each.
The above results show that approximating the minimal dissatisfaction of agents is difficult. On the other hand, if we focus on agents' total satisfaction then constant-factor approximation exist in many cases (see, e.g., the work of Lu and Boutilier [19] 
Proof. Let us fix a DPSF α where each entry is polynomially bounded in the number of alternatives. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that for some β, 0 < β ≤ 1, there is a β-approximation algorithm A for α-Minmax-Monroe-Assignment-Dec. We will show that the existence of this algorithm implies that X3C is solvable in polynomial time.
Let I be an X3C instance with ground set U = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a collection F = {F 1 , . . . , F m } of subsets of U . Each set in F has cardinality three. Further, w.l.o.g., we can assume that n is divisible by three and that each i ∈ U appears in at most three sets from F. Given I, we form an instance I M of α-Minmax-Monroe-Assignment-Dec as follows.
. The set N of agents is partitioned into two subsets, N 1 and N 2 . N 1 contains n agents (intuitively, corresponding to the elements of the ground set U ) and N 2 contains n agents (used to enforce certain properties of the solution). The set of alternatives A is partitioned into two subsets, A 1 and A 2 . We set A 1 = {a 1 , . . . , a m } (members of A 1 correspond to the sets in F), and we set A 2 = {b 1 , . . . , b m }, where m = n 3 . For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set M f (j) = {a i | j ∈ F i }. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we set the preference order of the j'th agent in N 1 to be of the form
Note that by our assumptions, M f (j) ≤ 3. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n , we set the preference order of the j'th agent in N 2 to be of the form
Note that each agent in N 2 ranks the alternatives from A 1 in positions positions m + 1, . . . , m + m. Finally, we set the budget/number of candidates that can be selected, to be K = n+n 3 . Now, consider the solution Φ returned by A on I M . We will show that Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , m} be a set such that i∈I F i = U and I = n 3 . We assign each agent j from N 1 to the alternative a i such that (a) i ∈ I and (b) j ∈ F i , and we assign each agent from N 2 to his or her most preferred alternative. Thus, Algorithm A has to return an assignment with the minimal satisfaction greater or equal to β · α m+m dec 
Then, by the definition of DPSFs, it holds that:
Using the fact that m = (α m+1 dec (1)· 1−β β +3) and using (2), we can transform inequality (1) to obtain the following:
This means that if the minimal satisfaction of an agent is at least β · α m+m dec (3), then no agent was assigned to an alternative that he or she ranked beyond position m . If some agent j from N 1 were assigned to an alternative from A 2 , then, by the pigeonhole principle, some agent from N 2 were assigned to an alternative from A 1 . However, each agent in N 2 ranks the alternatives from A 1 beyond position m and thus such an assignment is impossible. In consequence, it must be that each agent in j was assigned to an alternative that corresponds to a set F i in F that contains j. Such an assignment directly leads to a solution for I.
Let us now move on to the case of Minmax-CC-Assignment-Dec family of problems. Unfortunately, in this case our inapproximability argument holds for the case of Borda DPSF only (though we believe that it can be adapted to other DPSFs as well). Further, in our previous theorems we were showing that existence of a respective constant-factor approximation algorithm implies that NP collapses to P. In the following theorem we will show a seemingly weaker collapse of W [2] to FPT.
Intuitively, FPT is a class of problems that can be solved in time f (k)n O(1) , where n is the size of the input instance, k is a so-called parameter (some quantity, typically characterizing the difficulty of the instance), and f is some computable function. For example, for the Set-Cover and Vertex-Cover problems one often takes K as the value of the parameter. In the world of parametrized complexity, FPT is viewed as the class of easy problems (analogous to the class P), whereas classes W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ · · · are believed to form a hierarchy of classes of hard problems (somewhat analogous to the class NP). It holds that FPT ⊆ W [1] , but it seems unlikely that FPT = W [1] , let alone FPT = W [2] . We point the reader to the books of Niedermeier [21] and Flum and Grohe [13] for detailed overviews of parametrized complexity theory. Interestingly, while both Set-Cover and VertexCover are NP-complete, the former is W[2]-complete and the latter belongs to FPT (see, e.g., the book of Niedermeier [21] for these now-standard results and their history).
To prove hardness of approximation for α B,dec -Minmax-CC-Assignment-Dec, we first prove the following simple lemma.
Lemma 6. Let K, p, l be three positive integers and let X be a set of cardinality lpK. There exists a family S = {S 1 , . . . , S ( lK K ) } of pK-element subsets of X such that for each K-element subset B of X, there is a set S i ∈ S such that B ⊆ S i .
Proof. Set X = [lK] and let Y be a family of all K-element subsets of X . Replace each element i of X with p new elements (at the same time replacing i with the same p elements within each set in Y that contains i). As a result we obtain two new sets, X and Y , that satisfy the statement of the theorem (up to the renaming of the elements). Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is some constant β, 0 < β ≤ 1, and a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm A for α m B,dec -Minmax-CC-AssignmentDec. We will show that the existence of this algorithm implies that Set-Cover is fixedparameter tractable for the parameter K (since Set-Cover is known to be W[2]-complete for this parameter, this will imply FPT = W [2] ).
Let I be an instance of Set-Cover with ground set U = [n] and family F = {F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F m } of subsets of U . Given I, we build an instance I CC of α m B,dec -Minmax-CC-Assignment-Dec as follows. The set of agents N consists of n subsets of agents, N 1 , . . . , N n , where each group N i contains exactly n = 2 β K K agents. Intuitively, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the agents in the set N i correspond to the element i in U . The set of alternatives A is partitioned into two subsets, A 1 and A 2 , such that A 1 = {a 1 , . . . , a m } is a set of alternatives corresponding to the sets from the family F, and
is a set of dummy alternatives needed for our construction. We set m = A = m + A 2 . Before we describe the preference orders of the agents in N , we form a family R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } of preference orders over A 2 that satisfies the following condition: For each Kelement subset B of A 2 , there exists r j in R such that all members of B are ranked among the bottom ); further, the proof of the lemma provides an algorithmic way to construct R.
We form the preference orders of the agents as follows. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, set M f (i) = {a t | i ∈ F t }. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n , the j'th agent from N i has preference order of the form:
(we pick any arbitrary, polynomial-time computable order of candidates within M f (i) and M l (i)).
Let Φ be an assignment computed by A on I M . We will show that (⇐) If there exists a solution for I (i.e., a cover of U with K sets from F), then we can easily show an assignment where each agent is assigned to an alternative that he or she ranks among the top m positions (namely, for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we assign all the agents from the set N j to the alternative a i ∈ A 1 such that j ∈ F i and F i belongs to the alleged K-element cover of U ). Under this assignment, the least satisfied agent's satisfaction is at least m − m and, thus, A has to return an assignment Φ where
(⇒) Let us now consider the opposite direction. We assume that A found an assignment Φ such that
and we will show that I is a yes-instance of SetCover. We claim that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, at least one agent j in N i were assigned to an alternative from A 1 . If all the agents in N i were assigned to alternatives from A 2 , then, by the construction of R, at least one of them would have been assigned to an alternative that he or she ranks at a position greater than
Since for x = m(1+β) K K we have:
(we skip the straightforward calculation). This means that this agent would have been assigned to an alternative that he or she ranks at a position greater than m − m β + mβ. As a consequence, this agent's satisfaction would be lower than (m − m)β. Similarly, no agent from N i can be assigned to an alternative from M l (i). Thus, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, there exists at least one agent j ∈ N i that is assigned to an alternative from M f (i). In consequence, the covering subfamily of F consists simply of those sets F k , for which some agent is assigned to alternative a k ∈ A 1 . The presented construction gives the exact algorithm for Set-Cover problem running
The existence of such an algorithm means that Set-Cover is in FPT. On the other hand, we know that SetCover is W[2]-complete, and thus if A existed then FPT = W [2] would hold.
Approximation Algorithms
We now turn to approximation algorithms for Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting rules (both of which are special cases of our resource allocation problem).
Indeed, if one focuses on agents' total satisfaction then it is possible to obtain high-quality approximation results. In particular, we show the first nontrivial (randomized) approximation algorithm for α B,dec -Monroe-Assignment-Dec (for each > 0, we can provide a randomized polynomial-time algorithm that achieves 0.715 − approximation ratio), and the first polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for α B,dec -CC-Assignment-Dec. These results stand in a sharp contrast to those from the previous section, where we have shown that approximation is hard for essentially all remaining variants of the problem.
The core difficulty in solving α-Monroe/CC-Assignment problems lays in selecting the alternatives that should be assigned to the agents. Given a preference profile and a set A of K alternatives, using a standard network-flow argument, it is easy to match them optimally to the agents.
Proposition 8 (Implicit in the paper of Betzler et al. [4] ). Let α be a normal DPSF, N be a set of agents, A be a set of alternatives, V be a preference profile of N over A, and A a K-element subset of A (where K divides N ). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an optimal assignment Φ of the alternatives from A to the agents, both for α 1 and for min α , both for the case where each alternative in A should be assigned to the same number of agents (Monroe's case) and for the case without additional restrictions (Chamberlin and Courant's case).
Thus, in the algorithms in this section, we will focus on the issue of selecting the alternatives and not on the issue of matching them to the agents.
Monroe's System
We first consider α B,dec -Monroe-Assignment-Dec. Perhaps the most natural approach to solve this problem is to build a solution iteratively: In each step we pick some not-yetassigned alternative a i (using some criterion) and assign him or her to those N K agents that (a) are not assigned to any other alternative yet, and (b) whose satisfaction of being matched with a i is maximal. It turns out that this idea, implemented formally in Algorithm 1, works very well in many cases. We provide a lower bound on the total satisfaction it guarantees in the next lemma. (For each positive integer k, we let
Proof. Our algorithm computes an optimal solution for K ≤ 2. Thus we assume K ≥ 3. Let us consider the situation in the algorithm after the i'th iteration of the outer loop (we have i = 0 if no iteration has been executed yet). So far, the algorithm has picked i alternatives and assigned them to i n K agents (recall that for simplicity we assume that K divides n evenly). Hence, each agent has Notation: Φ ← a map defining a partial assignment, iteratively built by the algorithm. Φ ← ← the set of agents for which the assignment is already defined. Φ → ← the set of alternatives already used in the assignment. if K ≤ 2 then compute the optimal solution using an algorithm of Betzler et al. [4] and return. 
In consequence, the n K agents assigned in the next step of the algorithm will have the total satisfaction at least
Thus, summing over the K iterations, the total satisfaction guaranteed by the assignment Φ computed by Algorithm 1 is at least the following value (see the comment below for the fourth inequality; for the last inequality we assume K ≥ 3):
The fourth equality holds because:
If each agent were assigned to his or her top alternative, the total satisfaction would be equal to (m − 1)n. Thus we get the following bound:
This completes the proof.
Note that in the above proof we measure the quality of our assignment against a perhapsimpossible, perfect solution, where each agent is assigned to his or her top alternative. This means that for relatively large m and K, and small K m ratio, the algorithm can achieve a close-to-ideal solution irrespective of the voters' preference orders. We believe that this is an argument in favor of using Monroe's system in multiwinner elections. On the flip side, to obtain a better approximation ratio, we would have to use a more involved bound on the quality of the optimal solution. To see that this is the case, form an instance I of α B,dec -Monroe-Assignment-Dec with n agents and m alternatives, where all the agents have the same preference order, and where the budget is K (and where K divides n). It is easy to see that each solution that assigns the K universally top-ranked alternatives to the agents is optimal. Thus the total dissatisfaction of the agents in the optimal solution is:
.
By taking large enough m and K (even for a fixed value of m K ), the fraction 1 −
can be arbitrarily close to the approximation ratio of our algorithm (the reasoning here is somewhat in spirit of the idea of identifying maximally robust elections, as studied by Shiryaev, Yu, and Elkind [28] ).
Betzler et al. [4] showed that for each fixed constant K, α B,dec -Monroe-AssignmentDec can be solved in polynomial time. Thus, for small values of K for which the fraction
affects the approximation guarantees of Algorithm 1 too much, we can use this polynomialtime algorithm to find an optimal solution. This means that we can essentially disregard the H K K part of Algorithm 1's approximation ratio. In consequence, the quality of the solution produced by Algorithm 1 most strongly depends on the ratio K−1 m−1 . In most cases we can expect it to be small (for example, in Polish parliamentary elections K = 460 and m ≈ 6000; in this case the greedy algorithm's approximation ratio is about 0.96). For the remaining cases, for example, when K > m 2 , we can use a simple sampling-based randomized algorithm described below.
The idea of this algorithm is to randomly pick K alternatives and match them optimally to the agents, using Proposition 8. Naturally, such an algorithm might be very unlucky and pick K alternatives that all of the agents rank low. Yet, if K is large relative to m then it is likely that such a random sample would include a large chunk of some optimal solution. In the lemma below, we asses the expected satisfaction obtained with a single sampling step (relative to the satisfaction given by the optimal solution) and the probability that a single sampling step gives satisfaction close to the expected one. Naturally, in practice one should try several sampling steps and pick the one with the highest satisfaction.
Lemma 10. A single sampling step of the randomized algorithm for α B,dec -MonroeAssignment-Dec achieves expected approximation ratio of
Let p denote the probability that the relative deviation between the obtained total satisfaction and the expected total satisfaction is higher than ; for K ≥ 8 we have
Proof. Let N = [n] be the set of agents, A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } be the set of alternatives, and V be the preference profile of the agents. Let us fix some optimal solution Φ opt and let A opt be the set of alternatives assigned to the agents in this solution. For each a i ∈ A opt , we write sat(a i ) to denote the total satisfaction of the agents assigned to a i in Φ opt . Naturally, we have a∈Aopt sat(a) = OPT. In a single sampling step, we choose uniformly at random a K-element subset B of A. Then, we form a solution Φ B by matching the alternatives in B optimally to the agents (via Proposition 8). We write K opt to denote the random variable equal to A opt ∩ B , the number of sampled alternatives that belong to A opt . We define p i = Pr(K opt = i). For each j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we write X j to denote the random variable equal to the total satisfaction of the agents assigned to the j'th alternative from the sample. We claim that for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K, it holds that:
Why is this so? Given sample B that contains i members of A opt , our algorithm's solution is at least as good as a solution that matches the alternatives from B ∩ A opt in the same way as Φ opt , and the alternatives from B − A opt in a random manner. Since K opt = i and each a j ∈ A opt has equal probability of being in the sample, it is easy to see that the expected value of a j ∈B∩Aopt sat(a j ) is i K OPT. After we allocate the agents from B ∩ A opt , each of the remaining, unassigned agents has m − i positions in his or her preference order where he ranks the agents from A − A opt . For each unassigned agents, the average score value associated with these positions is at least
(this is so, because in the worst case the agent could rank the alternatives from B ∩ A opt in the top i positions). There are (n − i n K ) such not yet assigned agents and so the expected total satisfaction from assigning them randomly to the alternatives is
. This proves our bound on the expected satisfaction of a solution yielded by optimally matching a random sample of K alternatives.
Since OPT is upper bounded by (m − 1)n (consider a possibly-nonexistent solution where every agent is assigned to his or her top preference), we get that:
We can compute the unconditional expected satisfaction of Φ B as follows:
·i is the expected number of the alternatives in A opt , we have that
(one can think of summing the expected values of K indicator random variables; one for each element of A opt , taking the value 1 if a given alternative is selected and taking the value 0 otherwise). Further, from the generalized mean inequality we obtain
. In consequence, through routine calculation, we get that:
It remains to assess the probability that the total satisfaction obtained through Φ B is close to its expected value. Since X j ∈ 0,
, from Hoeffding's inequality we get:
We note that since
Further, for K ≥ 8, Lemma 9 (and the fact that in its proof we upper-bound OPT to be (m − 1)n) gives that OPT ≥ 
for α B,dec -CC-Assignement-Dec, improving upon the approximation algorithms of Lu and Boutilier [19] . However, it turns out that the additional freedom of Chamberlin and Courant's system allows us to go even further, and to design a polynomial-time approximation scheme for α B,dec -CC-Assignement-Dec.
The idea of our algorithm (presented as Algorithm 3 below) is to compute a certain value x and to greedily compute an assignment that (approximately) maximizes the number of agents assigned to one of their top-x alternatives. If after this process some agent has no alternative assigned, we assign him or her to his or her most preferred alternative from those already picked. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that this greedy strategy achieves highquality results. (Recall that for nonnegative real numbers, Lambert's W function, w(x), is defined to be the solution of the equality x = w(x)e w(x) .)
K . We will first give an inductive proof that, for each i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K, after the i'th iteration of the outer loop at most n(1 − w(K) K ) i agents are unassigned. Based on this observation, we will derive the approximation ratio of our algorithm.
For i = 0, the inductive hypothesis holds because n(1 − w(K) K ) 0 = n. For each i, let n i denote the number of unassigned agents after the i'th iteration. Thus, after the i'th iteration there are n i unassigned agents, each with x unassigned alternatives among his or her top-x ranked alternatives. As a result, at least one unassigned alternative is present in at least n i x m−i of top-x positions of unassigned agents. This means that after the (i + 1)'st iteration the number of unassigned agents is:
If for a given i the inductive hypothesis holds, that is, if n i ≤ n 1 −
, then:
Thus the hypothesis holds and, as a result, we have that:
Let Φ be the assignment computed by our algorithm. To compare it against the optimal solution, it suffices to observe that the optimal solution has satisfaction at most OPT ≤ (m − 1)n, that each agent selected during the first K steps has satisfaction at least m − x = m − mw(K) K , and that the agents not assigned within the first K steps have satisfaction no worse than 0. Thus it holds that:
Since for each > 0 there is a value K such that for each K > K it holds that 2w(K) K < , and α B,dec -CC-Assignment problem can be solved optimally in polynomial time for each fixed constant K(see the work of Betzler et al. [4] ), there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for α B,dec -CC-Assignment (i.e., a family of algorithms such that for each fixed β, 0 < β < 1, there is a polynomial-time β-approximation algorithm for α B,dec -CC-Assignment in the family; note that in PTASes we measure the running time by considering β to be a fixed constant).
Theorem 13. There is a PTAS for α B,dec -CC-Assignment. The idea used in Algorithm 3 can also be used to address a generalized Minmax-CCAssignment-Dec problem. We can consider the following relaxation of Minmax-CCAssignment-Dec: Instead of requiring that each agent's satisfaction is lower-bounded by some value, we ask that the satisfactions of a significant majority of the agents are lowerbounded by a given value. More formally, for a given constant δ, we introduce an additional quality metric: It would also be natural to try a sampling-based approach to solving α B,dec -CCAssignement-Dec, just as we did for the Monroe variant. Indeed, as recently (and independently) observed by Oren [23] , this leads to a randomized algorithm with expected approximation ratio of (1 − 
Conclusions
We have defined a certain resource allocation problem and have shown that it generalizes multiwinner voting rules of Monroe and of Chamberlin and Courant. Since it is known that these voting rules are hard to compute [4, 19, 25] , we focused on approximation properties of our problems. We have shown that if we focus on agents' dissatisfaction then our problems are hard to approximate up to any constant factor. The same holds for the case where we focus on least satisfied agent's satisfaction. However, for the case of optimizing total satisfaction, we have shown good approximate solutions for the special cases of the resource allocation problem pertaining to Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's voting systems. In particular, we have shown a randomized algorithm that for Monroe's system achieves approximation ratio arbitrarily close to 0.715, and for Chamberlin and Courant's system we have shown a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Table 1 summarizes the presented results. The most pressing, natural open question is whether there is a PTAS for Monroe's system. We plan to address the problem of finding approximate solution in the general framework for the case of optimizing total satisfaction and to empirically verify the quality of our algorithms.
